Define the following Terms of Legal Rights
Another particular type of legal claim, or group of rights that is increasingly respected by theorists, is the right to property. The discussion about this belongs more to that of the property itself – see the entry on the property. Only a few very brief points are raised here. All claims or debts with a time limit fall under the category of imperfect rights. Rather, most authors felt that rights should be analyzed in other, more fundamental terms, mainly those of duty, permission, and power, perhaps with the addition of other criteria. This means that not all rights will be of great importance. Their importance depends on the strength of the reasons for duty, permission or power. Before taking a closer look at these reports, it is worth mentioning another point. Theorists are divided between those who think that rights are, so to speak, the “reflex” of duty, permission or power, and those who think that the law takes precedence over them.
The question is whether duty, etc., gives rise to the right or to the right to duty. Most older writers (e.g., Bentham, Austin, Hohfeld, Kelsen) seem to have adhered to the first view, while more recent writers (e.g., MacCormick, Raz, Wellman) adopt the latter. The second view implies that the power of a right is not necessarily exhausted by the resulting existing tariffs, etc., but may be a reason for the creation of new obligations when circumstances change. The latter view seems to be at least more consistent with the way constitutional legal rights work. Below you will find a case law that defines the notion of legal claim. A legal claim is a claim that is legally recognized and enforceable. [In folwell`s estate, 68 N.J. Eq. 728, 731 (N.J.
1905)]. Hereditary rights can be transferred from one generation to the next, that is, this right remains even after the death of its owner. Example: A son is the rightful heir to his father`s property after his death. The question here is whether there are fundamental aspects of rights that are exclusive or at least more important in legal systems, as opposed to morality. In the above examples, we can say that the right token, unlike the right type, arises only when the condition of its instantiation is triggered. But legal systems sometimes say that the right token exists before one of the conditions for exercising the right exists. Essentially, it is the difference between the statement “if p, X is entitled to A” and “X has a right if p, to A”. In the latter case, the implication is that the right token exists now, not just that it will exist. Why should we say that? One proposed answer is that, contrary to morality, legal systems have developed sets of rules for the transfer of rights even before the condition for triggering the exercise of the right has occurred. For many legal rights, a condition of their possession or exercise must be met. This in itself does not distinguish between legal rights and many moral rights. Just as you are only legally entitled to compensation for bodily harm if you have been attacked, you have a moral excuse to be insulted only if you have been insulted.
But legal rights can lead to more complicated situations that rarely occur in morality. The presentation of the above rights has been largely written from the point of view of Anglo-American law and philosophy. However, it is worth mentioning that there is an aspect of legal rights that can be found among European continental writers, but of which there is no trace in the Anglo-American tradition. It is the description of rights as “subjective” (subjective rights; subjective rights). More recent versions, such as those of Raz (1984a, 1984b), take a completely different path. To say that X is a rights holder means, in their opinion, to say that his interests or any aspect thereof are sufficient reason to impose obligations on others, either not to interfere with X in the performance of an action, or to secure him in something. Among other things, this circumvents the problem of the rights of third parties, because the statement is simply that it is only a question of whether the system recognizes the interests of Z as part of the reason for the obligations of X and Y or whether it is only the interests of X and Y. Raz (1997) pointed out that this does not mean that only the interests of the rightholder are relevant to the question of whether something should be recognized. as a right.
Considerations of general or common interest may also be relevant. Rights are equally divided into rights and equitable. The first are those in which the party has legal ownership of a thing, and in this case their recourse for a violation of it by a lawsuit before a court. Although the person holding the legal title may not have a vested interest but can only be held as a trustee, the action must be made in his or her name and not generally in his or her name of the trust. The latter rights or equitable rights are those that can be enforced in a fair court by the Trust. Constitutions will also differ according to the extent to which human rights recognized by international law or the treaty are recognized in national law. For example, in some European countries, the European Convention on Human Rights and related decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are transposed into national law and take precedence over all national laws that are incompatible with them. In others, such as the United Kingdom, courts must interpret the legislation as much as possible in such a way that it is in conformity with the Convention, but do not have the power to punish it, even if they consider it to be clearly contradictory. Relative rights are public or private: the former are those that exist between the people and the government, such as the right to protection of the people and the right of loyalty that the people have the right to government; The second is the mutual rights of husband and wife, parents and child, guardian and guardian, master and servant.
Although Mill`s view that all rights are linked to the foundations of well-being is not necessarily shared, many contemporary writers (e.g., Raz 1984a, 1984b; Wellman 1985, 1995) agree that the basic concept of a law is something common to law and morality, although some have argued that legal drafters, particularly Hohfeld, provide a better and clearer starting point for general analysis than previous authors of moral philosophy. The view that the basic concept is common to both seems to be consistent with the assertion that legal rights in relation to justification in practical reasoning should, however, be based on moral rights. Second, it should be noted that property rights in the law can be of many different types. Although property is obviously one of the most important, another important class is possession, whether temporary or relatively permanent. For example, the right to use a car you rented for a week or to live in a certain house for the rest of your life. Still other species that have neither possession nor possession could be, for example, crossing the field of the local farmer or letting the neighbor next door maintain his side of the wall of the common garden.